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COMMENTS
The Supreme Court's Interpretation Of The Civil
Rights Act of 1964: Liberty, Equality, and the
Limitation of Judicial Power?
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964l marked the beginning of a new era in the history of antidiscrimination law in
America. Described as "the most comprehensive piece of civil
the Act declared that "[nlo
rights legislation ever pr~posed,"~
person in the United States hall"^ be denied the right to vote:
to use public accommodations,' facilities: or schools,? to enjoy
the benefits of federally funded programs,' or to have employment opportunitiese "because of such individual's color, religion,
sex, or national origin."1°
Congress defined the Civil Rights Act's purpose as being "to
assure the existing right to equal treatment."" This principle of
t This Comment was the first-place entry of the 1980 Welch Legal Writing
Competition, a competition for third-year law student writing a t the J. Reuben Clark
Law School. The competition is endowed by Mr. and Mrs. John S. Welch of La Canada,
California. Mr. Welch is a partner of the Los Angeles law firm of Latham & Watkins.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version a t 42 U.S.C. $5 1971, 2000a to
2000h-6 (1976)).
NEGRO524 (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrardo eds.
2. CIVILRIGHTSAND THE AMERICAN
1968).
3. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d (1976). Accord, id. 5 2000a ("All persons shall be entitled to"
enjoyment of public accommodations); id. $ 2000e-2(a)(l) (unlawful "to discriminate
against any individual").
4. Id. 5 1971 (title I).
5. Id. $$ 2000a to 2000a-6 (title 11).
6. Id. $5 2000b to 2000b-3 (title 111).
7. Id. 55 2000c to 2000~-9(title IV).
8. Id. $5 2000d to 2000d-6 (title VI).
9. Id. $5 2000e to 2000e-17 (title VII).
lo. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Accord, id. 5 2000a(a) (all persons entitled to enjoy public
accommodations "without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, rez
ligion, or national origin"); id. 5 2000b (protecting persons deprived of equal protection
of laws "on account of [their] race, color, religion, or national origin"); id. § 2000d (no
person shall be excluded from participation in federally assisted programs "on the
ground of race, color, or national origin").
11. 110 CONG.REC.1519 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler). Accord, id. at 7207 ("What
Title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accomplish is equal treatment for all.") (Justice Department interpretative memorandum); id. a t 12,614 ("Every
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individual equality provided a basis for a "meeting of the
minds" and a common national purpose "in the long struggle to
eliminate social prejudice and the effects of prejudice."" Thus,
under the aegis of an equal treatment value, the 1960's saw the
elimination of the most flagrant forms of racial discrimination.lS
When it became apparent that equal treatment would not
entirely eradicate the effects of past discrimination, the suggestion that the law adopt an equal status or equal results value
became more insistent." Some commentators warned that adherence to an absolutist view of equality threatened libertarian
values.15 To some degree, the development of antidiscrimination
law has reflected the tension between libertarian and egalitarian
points of view. In general, however, the courts have favored
more and more equality.16
American citizen has the right to equal treatment-not favored treatment, not complete
individual equality-just equal treatment.") (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
Congressmen also frequently stated that the Act would be colorblind in its application, see, e.g., id. a t 5253 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. a t 6564 (remarks of Sen.
Kuchel), and that it would not permit differences in treatment on the basis of race, see,
e.g., id. a t 5611-13 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. a t 5863-64, 5866 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey). See also T. EASTLAND
& W. BEN^, COUNTING
BY RACE113-14, 143, 205AFFIRMATIVE
DISCRIMINATION:
ETHNICINEQUALITY
AND PUBLIC
208 (1979); N. GLAZER,
POLICY
4, 43-45 (1975).
12. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,416 n.19 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.L. REV. 1, 2 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public Law, 15
VILL.L. REV.1, 3, 5-6, 9, 17 (1969); Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS
L. REV.268,280-84 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Blumrosen, Seniority]; Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66-75 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination]; Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV.L. REV. 1598, 1673-78 (1969).
This Comment uses the terms "equal treatment" and "equal status" consistently
with their use by Professor Owen Fiss in Fiss, Croups and the Equal Protection Clause,
5 PHILOSOPHY
& PUB.Am. 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fiss, Groups]. Equal treatment is sometimes referred to as "equality of opportunity," equal status as "equal
achievement" or "equality of results." See also Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington
Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.725,727-28 & n.21
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Proof of Purpose].
15. See, e.g., D. SCHAEFER,
THENEWEGALITARIANISM
(1979).
16. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (authorizing voluntary preferential treatment in employment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (consideration of race in admissions decisions permitted in
some circumstances); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (approving race-conscious measures remedying de facto discrimination); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
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While the academic community has been at the forefront,
the law's gradual shift in emphasis from equal treatment to
equal status has been aided greatly by reliance on interpretative
guidelines and regulations issued by federal agencies.'' These
developments pose significant questions about the roles of the
respective coordinate branches in the development of civil rights
policy. The issue of separation of powers looms particularly large
in attempting to delineate the limits of judicial power to interpret civil rights legislation. This Comment examines the Supreme Court's use of statutory interpretation in developing liability and remedy theories in the Civil Rights Act cases.
In interpreting the Civil Rights Act, members of the Supreme Court have frequently disagreed on whether an equal
treatment or equal status value should be implemented. After
contrasting the general interpretative approach of the Justices
who advocate equal status with the approach of those who favor
equal treatment, this Comment evaluates the policies that underlie each approach in light of traditional democratic theory.
Part I of the Comment reviews the ideological tension between
the values of liberty and equality which has figured prominently
in the formulation of antidiscrimination law. The Court's treatment of the issues presented in the Civil Rights Act cases generally falls under the rubric of one or the other of these two values, as is shown in part 11. Part I11 summarizes the
interpretative techniques that characterize the results reached in
the cases. Finally, an interpretative approach that emphasizes
the legislative role is defended against arguments that favor a
judicial role in the formulation of civil rights policy.

A. The Ideology of Equality
Primacy of the individual is classical liberalism's fundamental tenet. In this tradition, individuals, rather than groups, are
the most important unit in society; consequently, the primary
function of societal arrangements is to allow the individual maxBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (busing).
& W. BENNETT, supra note 11, at 11-12, 131-36; N. GLAZER,
17. See T. EASTLAND
supra note 11, at 45-66; G. ORFIELD,THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF SOUTHERN
EDUCATION
3346 (1969).
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imum freedom to fulfill his or her own purposes.18 Inequality
among individuals is justified as a natural consequence of a aystem of liberty.'. So long as an individual in acquisition of society's goods does not purposefully disadvantage another, he is entitled to do with his property as he chooses. Because differences
among individuals are essentially the product of "congenital,"
rather than environmental, factors,aOresulting inequalities are
not morally suspect.
Given a diversity of temperaments and desires, the essential
role of law is to provide neutral rules and procedures whereby
members of society have an equal opportunity to accomplish
their individual purposes. The libertarian ethic rejects the notions "that skin color and ethnicity [are] relevant in any public
Simior private consideration of the worth of an indi~idual."~~
larly, equal treatment demands that such matters as race, religion, sex, and national origin be irrelevant to law.
"[I]n formal contradiction to the principle of individualism," modern equalitarianism makes a claim for "group
rights."" Accordingly, the primary function of societal arrangements is to insure that no group in society is significantly worse
off than any other group. Even inequalities that result from natural abilities and talents (as opposed to those that result from
historical and social fortune) are morally unjustified. The distribution of society's goods that results from such abilities is, according to John Rawls, "the outcome of the natural lottery; and
In addithis outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspe~tive."~~
tion, "[ilt is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of
achievement and culture for those similarly endowed" because
of the institution of the family: "Even the willingness to make
an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is
18. Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, PUBLIC
INTEREST,
Fall 1972, reprinted in D.
SCHAEFER,
supra note 15, a t 29. See generally 2 F. HAYEK,
LAW,LEGISLATION,
AND LIBERTY (1976); H.JAFFA,THECONDITIONS
OF FREEDOM
(1975); Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHICS191 (1971).
19. F. HAYEK,
THECONSTITUTION
OF LIBERTY
85-93 (1960).
20. Id. at 86.
21. T. EASTLAND
& W. BENNETT,
supra note 11, a t 10. Professor Bell notes that
"[tlhe liberal principle accepts the elimination of social differences in order to assure an
equal start, but it justifies unequal result on the basis of natural abilities and talents."
Bell, supra note 18, at 41 (emphasis in original). See also F. HAYEK,
supra note 19, at 8586, 92.
TAKING
RIGHTSSERIOUSLY
22. Bell, supra note 18, a t 44. See generally R. DWORKIN,
(1977).
A THEORY
OF JUSTICE
74 (1971).
23. J. RAWLS,
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itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances. . . [Tlherefore we may want to adopt a principle
which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects
of the natural 10th-y.'n4 The rule that Rawls would have guide
the law requires equal distribution of social and economic goods:
"no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without
giving or receiving compensating advantages in return."26 Similarly, equal status requires that the law take account of religion,
ethnicity, class, and color, in order to insure "equality as a fact
and as a result.""
Like their philosophical counterparts, equal treatment and
equal status are fundamentally at odds. Like liberty, the equal
treatment principle is "process-oriented." Its implementation in
antidiscrimination law "emphasizes the purification of the decisional process."27 Equal status, on the other hand, is "result-oriented." Its implementation, similar to Rawls' theory of equality,
"emphasizes the achievement of a certain result, improvement of
the economic and social position of the protected group."28 In
short, equal treatment seeks to assure procedural equality; equal
status, substantive equality.

.

B. Application of Equal Treatment and Equal Status
Principles to Antidiscrimination Law
The conflict between liberty and equality readily appears as
these values are applied in moral and political philosophy. Similarly, the ideas of equal treatment and equal status have engendered conflicting theories of liability and opposing remedies in
antidiscrimination law.
1. Equal treatment

a. Liability theory. The equal treatment value embodies
the right to be treated as an equal; it seeks to protect individuals
24. Id.
25. Id. at 102. See also R. DWORKIN,
supra note 22, at 272-74.
26. Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University Commencement
IN TWENT~ETH
CENTURY
AMERICA
226 (J. Franklin
(June 4, 1965), quoted in THENEGRO
& I. Starr eds. 1967).
27. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in
the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.742, 764
(1974).
28. Id.
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from discrimination on the basis of color, religion, sex, or national origin. However, equal treatment does not protect individuals from discrimination on such bases as merit or ability.
Therefore, a test that eliminates a disproportionate number of
black or Spanish-American applicants would not violate equal
treatment principles if it legitimately measured suitability for a
particular job requirement; it would violate those principles,
however, if it were used as a pretext to eliminate them because
of their color or ethnicity.'@Therefore, liability for a violation of
the right to equal treatment arises only when the plaintiff shows
that the defendant purposefully disadvantages him because of
his membership in a proscribed class.so Accordingly, a court's
use of language emphasizing purpose or motive indicates its adherence to the equal treatment value.
b. Remedial theory. Race-conscious remedies awarded
pursuant to findings of unlawful discrimination do not necessarily violate equal treatment principles. In the case of a courtto
ordered remedy, race "is being used symptomatically .
identify the victims" of an unlawful practice. Therefore, "the
benefits are not being conferred because of their race but because they are victims of di~crimination.'"~A remedial order
may be transformed into a "mechanism for securing not equal
but preferential treatment," however, when the benefit awarded
exceeds the harm done.sa But, "[n]otwithstanding the outward
appearance of unequal treatment," when a court grants compensation only for the injury inflicted, "the beneficiaries are merely

..

29. "Equal treatment," as it is used in this Comment, does not call for strict colorblindness. Rather, the appropriate inquiry under this concept is whether the challenged
practice is based on a proscribed criterion or some other factor, and whether the conferral of a benefit constituted preferential or equal treatment.
30. "A discriminatory purpose test is closely related to the value of equal treatment,
for it attempts to proscribe explicit consideration of race." Proof of Purpose, supra note
14, a t 731. Equal treatment does not necessarily require proof of "evil motive" or "mens
rea." See Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, supra note 14, at 66-67. Accord,
SOVERN,
LEGALRESTRAINTS
ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT
70-73 (1966).
Compare Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation
I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 907, 955-56 (1967) and Note, An American Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. CHI.L. REV. 107, 109 (1949) with Comment,
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civii Rights Act
of 1866 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory Purpose?, 1978 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1030, 1035-37 [hereinafter cited as Burden of Proofl.
31. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.235,307-08 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Fiss, Fair Employment Laws].
32. Id. a t 307. Accord, Seelman, Employment Testing Law: The Federal Agencies
Go Public With the Problems, 10 URB. LAW.1, 63 (1978).
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treated equally."''
The fact that a remedy awarded to a discrimination victim
may deprive an innocent third person of a benefit does not violate equal treatment so long as the victim is given only his due.
Equal treatment requires that a court "eliminate only that portion of the [harm] attributable to past dis~rimination."~~
Efforts
by courts to limit remedies in this fashion therefore evidence endorsement of equal treatment.
So-called benign discrimination violates equal treatment because the essential mutuality between wrongdoer and beneficiary
is lacking."' Unless the race-conscious measure is linked to an
identified, individualized harm, there is no justification for preferring one person over another.36This does not imply that only
courts are capable of ascertaining the victims of discrimination,
the extent of the injury, and the consequent harm." Equal treatment does require, however, that these determinations comport
with principles of procedural fairne~s.'~
2. Equal status

a. Liability theory. The equal status value embodies the
right to be treated unequally in order to achieve equal results; it
protects individuals against any device that causes inequality,
regardless of the intent with which the device is used.'@ Prima
facie liability for a violation of the right to equal status arises
33. Fiss, Fair Employment Laws, supra note 31, at 308.
34. Id. at 307.
35. See Brest, supra note 13, at 39-43.
36. For an overview of the relationship between equal treatment, equal status, and
preferential treatment, see EQUALITY
AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT
(M. Cohen, T. Nagel
& T. Scanlond eds. 1977).
37. "We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(emphasis added).
38. Justice Powell suggests that only certain governmental bodies can perform this
function without violating the principle of equal treatment:
[Ilsolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria. Before relying upon these sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have the authority
and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to
identified discrimination.
Id. at 309 (citations and footnote omitted).
39. See cases cited in Proof of Purpose, supra note 14, at 728 n.24.

302

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

any time a practice has a disparate impact on members of certain classes.40
Disparate impact analysis has emerged as one of the principal means for implementing an equal status value." In the
1960's this new theory was developed in response to efforts by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
Departments of Justice and Labor, the NAACP, the Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and other plaintiffs' counsel to
formulate a concept of discrimination that would accelerate the
economic progress of minority group^.'^ Disparate impact analysis accomplishes this result in two ways. First, plaintiffs are
aided by a presumption that differential impact is the functional
equivalent of discrimination according to race or some other for. ~ short,
~
bidden c r i t e r i ~ nIn
a showing of disparate impact shifts
the burden of p r o d ~ c t i o n Second,
.~~
the rebuttal burden is set so
high under an equal status standard that it is rarely met. Consequently, plaintiffs will usually prevail merely by showing adverse
impact." Use of disparate impact analysis, then, indicates adherence to an equal status standard.
b. Remedial theory. Preferential treatment46abrogates the
40. See Seelman, supra note 32, at 55-56; Proof of Purpose, supra note 14, a t 729 &
n.27.
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
LAW6541. See generally B. SCHLEI& P. GROSSMAN,
75 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial' Discrimination, 125 U .
PA. L. REV. 540, 553-62 (1977); Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment
Testing: Statistical Proof under Title VII, 91 HARV.L. REV.793 (1978); Shoben, Probing
the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact
Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV.1 (1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case
in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 Hrurv. L. REV.
387 (1975).
42. Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, supra note 14, a t 69-70, 71, 74 & n.44..
See also Seelman, supra note 32, at 4. In 1968, Professor Blumrosen suggested "that the
objective criterion to which the civil rights interest is moving is the number of minorities
. . The reduction of differential unemployment
employed in various job classifications
rates between the minority and majority requires that employers hire greater proportions
of minorities." Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 22 RUTGERS
L. REV.465, 504 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Fair Recruitment]. See generally sources cited note 14, supra.
43. Fiss, Fair Employment Laws, supra note 31, a t 290-304. See also Burden of
Proof, supra note 30, a t 1051 & n.llO.
44. One commentator charges that the implementation of equal status through the
allocation of burden of proof has allowed "the manipulation of the courts to favor minorities." Producing evidence of disparate impact in testing cases, he suggests, "is no more
difficult than picking up stones from a gravel road. Plaintiffs utilizing adverse impact
evidence, thus, have no real burden of proof." Seelman, supra note 32, at 55.
45. Id. at 55-56.
46. The literature on preferential treatment is extensive. See, e.g., Ely, The Consti-

..
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mutuality principle. Commensurate with the idea of equal status, race-conscious remedial measures need not be granted solely
to identified victims of purposeful discrimination, nor need they
be paid for by adjudged wrongdoers. Favorable treatment is frequently justified under a group theory or an individual theory of
compensation. Under a group theory preferential treatment is
morally justified because of the individual's membership in a
group that has been treated unfairly in the past. Under an individual theory, compensation is justified because the individual
presumably has been treated unfairly at some point in his own
past?'
In the final analysis, the validity of race-conscious treatment under the equal status value does not depend on the legitimacy of these moral claims. Given absolute repudiation of inequality, equal status is its own justification for preferential
treatment. These theories are the product, however, of the "major new effort to provide a philosophical foundation-a conception of justice as fairness-for a communal society,"48 a society
founded on the equal status principle. Courts that authorize
preferential treatment implement equal status. Moreover, pursuant to its focus on substantive equality, equal status does not
require any particular procedural safeguards prerequisite to implementing remedial measures, and private individuals or institutions may grant preferential treatment as readily as courts or
other governmental bodies.'@

Antidiscrimination cases generally fall into two classes:
tutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Harkins,
Affirmative Action: The Constitution, Jurisprudence and the Formulation of Policy, 26
KAN.L. REV.85 (1977); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV.363 (1966).
AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT,
supra note 36.
47. See generally EQUALITY
48. Bell, supra note 18, a t 35. Bell describes the impetus for this effort as follows:
If equality of result is to be the main object of social policy . . . it will demand
an entirely new political agenda for the social systems of advanced industrial
countries. But no such political demand can ultimately succeed without being
rooted in some powerful ethical system . . . .
Id. See also Kristol, About Equality, COMMENTARY,
NOV.1972, reprinted in D. SCHAEFER,
supra note 15, at 219.
49. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14 HARV.C.R.X.L. L. REV.133 (1979).
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those involving disparate treatment and those involving disparate irnpact?O Disparate treatment means treating "some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Disparate impact involves "practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another?l
Because the civil rights cases generally involve both a finding of
liability and the determination of an appropriate remedy, the
Supreme Court may adopt equal treatment and equal status
theories in the same case. For example, the Court may decide in
a disparate impact case that disparate impact evidence alone establishes liability. However, the Court, consistent with the equal
treatment principle, may limit the remedy to neutralizing the
discriminatory effects of the facially neutral criteria. Where this
occurs, the liability and remedy issues are discussed separately,
according to the value implemented in deciding each issue.62

A. The Equal Treatment Cases
1. Developing a theory of liability in disparate treatment
cases: McDonnell Douglas, Teamsters, and Furnco

Most cases brought in the early years following enactment
50. These terms are often used to define the standard of proof required to trigger
"strict scrutiny" under the equal protection clause, see Proof of Purpose, supra note 14,
a t 726 & n.19, 730-31 & n.28, or to establish a prima facie violation of the Civil Rights
Act.
This Comment does not discuss cases that deal with procedural aspects of the Civil
Rights Act. For an example of a procedural case, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (title VII action not foreclosed by prior arbitral decision).
51. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
52. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In the early cases
the issue of which value is protected by the Civil Rights Act was not as sharply framed
as it later came to be. Compare McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1973), with General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Dicta in these cases indicated that the
Court believed equal treatment was intended though the holdings indicated the contrary.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), for example, held that evidence of disparate impact establishes a prima facie case, but stated that "[d]iscriminatory preference
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."
Id. a t 431. Consequently, Griggs has been cited in cases endorsing equal treatment as
well as in cases implementing equal status. Compare United Steelworkers ofAmerica v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 US. 273,
279 (1976); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,800 (1973) with Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136,141 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 32930 (1977); and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
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of the Civil Rights Act involved disparate treatment? Usually
the alleged discriminatory conduct did not challenge the traditional standards for allocating the burden of proof. As the most
flagrant discriminatory practices were eliminated,M however,
burden of proof more frequently became an issue?The Court
first formulated a detailed test for proof of racial discrimination
in disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. u.
Green." Green was a mechanic and long-time civil rights activist
who was laid off in the course of a general reduction in McDonnell Douglas Corporation's work force. In protesting his discharge, Green participated in an illegal "stall-in" and, as McDonne11 Douglas alleged, a "lock-in." Three weeks later, when
the company advertised for qualified mechanics, Green applied
for reemployment. According to McDonnell Douglas, Green's application was rejected because of his participation in the illegal
activities?'
The Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by proving four facts:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
53. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (refusal to serve
blacks); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (refusal to serve blacks); United States v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (conspiracy to injure blacks in the exercise of their right to
patronize restaurant); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (blacks convicted
for participating in "sit-ins" at lunch counters); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) (refusal to serve blacks); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964) (refusal to accommodate blacks).
The first title VII case to reach the Supreme Court, Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), involved disparate treatment. Martin Marietta had refused
job applications from women with pre-school-age children, but had employed men with
pre-school-age children. The Suphme Court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 required that similarly situated persons "be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex." Section 703(a) did not permit "one hiring policy
for women and another for men-each having pre-school-age children." The Court remanded for the trial court to determine whether "conflicting family obligations" justified
the disparate hiring policies under the bona fide occupational qualification exemption of
8 703(e). Id. a t 544.
54. See Brest, supra note 13, at 2.
55. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. DeRosie, 473 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1973); Dean v. Ashling, 409 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1969).
56. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. Id. at 794-96.
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complainant's qualification^.^^
Establishment of a prima facie case constitutes the first step in
the Court's liability formula. As to this first step, the Supreme
Court found, as did the lower court:@ that Green had met his
burden of proof. In the second step, the burden of going forward
shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejecti~n."~~
The Supreme
Court held that McDonnell Douglas had met its burden under
this second step.@lThe Court also defined a third step, that of
shifting the burden back to Green to prove that the employer's
stated reasons for refusing to employ him were in fact a
pretext.@%
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
decided four years after McDonnelI Douglas, involved two "pattern or p r a ~ t i c e "actions
~
against T.1.M.E.-D.C. Trucking Company and the Teamsters Union, challenging purposeful disparate
58. Id. at 802.
59. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
60. 411 U.S.at 802.
61. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit partly based its formulation of the
allocation of proof on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a disparate impact
case involving standardized testa and educational requirements. See Green v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d at 352 (revised majority opinion); 463 F.2d at 350,355 (Johnsen,
J., dissenting). Griggs held that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination under title VII by showing that the challenged selection criterion had an adverse
racial impact. The burden then shifted to the defendant to prove that the requirements
"bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs" for which they
are used. 401 U.S. at 431.
On appeal of McDonnell Douglas, however, the Supreme Court refused to extend
the Griggs burden of proof formulation to Green. Instead, Justice Powell emphasized
dictum in Griggs indicating that title VII prohibits " 'preference for any group, minority
or majority.' " He also noted that "[tlhere are societal as well as personal interests on
both sides of [the employment application] equation." 411 U.S. at 800-01 (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,401 U.S. at 430). What title VII requires is that employment
decisions be "racially neutral." However, the Court did accept the Griggs definition of
title VII's purpose, "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." Id. at 800.
62. 411 U.S.at 804. The Court did not suggest that the plaintiff must provide evidence of subjective intent. Indeed, citing Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination,
supra note 14, the Court went so far as to note that statistics "may be helpful" in meeting this burden. 411 U.S.at 805 & n.19. However, the Court warned against overreliance
on statistical data "We caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not
be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in
the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to hire." Id. at 805 n.19.
63. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
64. See id. at 366 11-16.

2951

CIVIL RIGHTS

307

treatment in the hiring, assignment, and promotion of minority
employees. The Supreme Court held that defendants had violated title VII by purposefully treating minority members less
favorably than white persons. The Court refined the McDonnell
Douglas liability theory by noting that in disparate treatment
cases "[plroof of discriminatory motive is c r i t i ~ a l . " ~ ~
In reaffirming the equal treatment conception of proof of
discriminatory motive, however, the Court clearly was not requiring "direct proof of dis~rimination."~~
Rather, the Court engaged the use of an inference that a "decision was based on a
discriminatory criterion" when the plaintiff shows that his rejection was not legitimately based on lack of qualification, the absence of a vacancy, or some other legitimate reason.07
The trend toward reinforcement of an equal treatment interpretation of title VII, a t least in disparate treatment cases,
continued in the following term. In Furnco Construction Corp.
v. water^,^' the Supreme Court rebuffed a lower court attempt
to shift the focus toward equal status. Furnco involved the alleged discriminatory refusal to hire three black bricklayers. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in construing the MeDonne11 Douglas test, required the employer to show that the
hiring method chosen "maximize[d] hiring of minority employee~"~
in@
order to rebut the prima facie finding of discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit's liability formula incorporated equal status
values by requiring employers not only to consider race in developing its hiring policies, but to choose a policy that would promote the employment of the largest number of minority
applicants.
The Court rejected this approach as without "support either
in the nature of the prima facie case or the purpose of Title
VII."70 R e a r m i n g the Teamsters case's equal treatment concept of discrimination, Justice Rehnquist noted that McDonnell
Douglas did not abrogate the plaintiffs burden of proving dis65. Id. at 335 n.15.
66. Id. at 358 11-44.
67. Id. at 358 & n.44.
68. 438 U S . 567 (1978).
69. Id. at 577-78. The court of appeals also "apparently equat[ed] a prima facie
showing . . . with an ultimate finding of fact as to discriminatory refusal to hire under
Title VII." Id. at 576. Such a standard of proof allows a plaintiff to establish a violation
of title VII merely by means of a presumption, rather than by proof of discrimination.
See id. at 577.
70. Id. at 577.
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criminatory intent.ll As long as an employer shows " 'some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [applicant's] rejection,' " the burden remains on the plaintiff to "introduce
evidence that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for
dis~rimination."~~
Moreover, the Court reaffirmed the equal
treatment principle "that the obligation imposed by Title VII is
to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of
race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race
are already proportionately represented in the work force."7s
In allocating the burden of proof in the disparate treatment
cases reviewed above, the Court has recognized the realities of
proof in modern discrimination cases without compromising the
equal treatment value. In light of the subtle forms in which racial discrimination can manifest itself," the Court has assisted
the plaintiff by presuming, in the absence of legitimate explanations to the contrary, that acts of disparate treatment "are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible fact o r ~ . "Nevertheless,
~~
attempts to dilute the equal treatment
value were firmly rebuffed in Furnco. However, it is unclear to
what extent the Court's commitment to equal treatment in these
cases resulted from deference to traditional standards of proof in
71. Id.
C
72. Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802). The
Court went on to note that statistical proof of a balanced work force was probative of a
nondiscriminatory "motive" and "not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent." Therefore, such evidence could be used to rebut the inference of "discriminatory animus" created by evidence of disparate treatment. Id. at 580.
73. Id. at 579. The Court reafl[irmed its intention to maintain an equal treatment
approach in disparate treatment cases in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). In a per curiam opinion, with four Justices dissenting, the
Court remanded a decision by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "[blecause [it]
appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco warrants." Id.
at 25. The First Circuit described the employer's burden under McDonnell Douglas as
"requiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive, [thus] plac[ing] the
burden squarely on the party with the greater access to such evidence." Sweeney v.
Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169,177 (1st Cir.), vacated, 439 U.S.
24 (1978). Such a standard, the Court noted, "would make entirely superfluous the third
step in the Furnco-McDonnell D o u g h analysis, since it would place on the employer at
the second stage the burden of showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext,
rather than requiring such proof from the employee as a part of the third step." Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 24 n.1. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the "Court's action implies that the recent opinion in [Furnco] made
some change in the law as explained in [McDonnell Douglas]." Id. at 26.
74. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 365 11-51.
75. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 577. Accord, International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
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disparate treatment cases or from a conviction that such standards are mandated by the terms of the Civil Rights Act.
2. McDonald-an equal treatment view of section 703(a)

Dicta in McDonnell Douglas, Teamsters, and Furnco suggest that the Court recognized in the Civil Rights Act a congressional intent to implement equal treatment." However, in formulating the liability theory developed in these cases, the Court
did not expressly interpret any prohibitory provision of the statute. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation CO.,~'the
Court interpreted section 703(a), one of title VII's prohibitory
sections. In doing so, the Court for the first time appeared to
expressly adopt an equal treatment interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act.18
Section 703(a) prohibits an employer from discharging "any
individual . . . because of such individual's race."7@In McDonald, three employees, one black and two white, were charged
with stealing sixty one-gallon cans of antifreeze from a Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Company shipment. The two white employees were discharged, while the black was retained. The lower
court dismissed the case on the ground that the disparate treatment "[did] not raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be
granted?" The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that
"Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be appli76. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that "[nlothing in Title VII compels an
employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in the . . . deliberate, unlawful
activity against it." 411 U.S. at 803. In several cases, the Court has made reference to
title VII's "purpose." See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 577; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Undoubtedly disparate
treatment was the moat obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII").
77. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
78. See id. at 278-85.
79. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
80. 427 U.S. at 278.
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cable were they Negroe~."~~
Justice Marshall began his analysis of the statute by noting
that the terms of section 703(a) "are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race."" The Civil Rights
Act prohibits " '[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial]
group, minority or majority.' "83 However, Justice Marshall
went even further in substantiating title VII's equal treatment
value by citing "uncontradicted legislative hist~ry."~'Moreover,
the Court expressly rejected the notion that benign discrimination against whites in "isolated cases" was acceptable under title
VII.86 Relying on the McDonnell Douglas case's liability theory,
the Court found that because the criteria for discharge had not
been " 'applied alike to members of all races,' " the petitioners'
title VII claims had to be r e i n ~ t a t e d . ~ ~
3. Teamsters and the perpetuation of effects of past discrimination: an equal treatment view of section 703(h)

Section 703(h) permits an employer "to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . .
system."" Seniority systems frequently have a disproportionate
adverse impact on minority employees because they perpetuate
the effects of prior discriminatory employment practices. Because they are race-neutral, however, seniority systems do not
normally give rise to liability under an equal treatment theory.
By contrast, Griggs v. Duke Power CO.,~'which involved stan81. Id. at 280.
82. Id. at 278-79.
83. Id. a t 279 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431) (emphasis in
original).
84. Id. at 280. Compare the Court's use of title VII's legislative history here with
that in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 US. 193, 203-07 (1979).
85. 427 U.S. at 280-81 n.8. However, the Court distinguished "isolated" acts of discrimination against whites from judicially imposed remedies or affirmative action programs "otherwise prompted." Id.
86. Id. a t 283, 285 (quoting 411 U.S. a t 804).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The section provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . system, . . . provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
88. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

.
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dardized tests and educational requirements, implemented an
equal status value in a disparate impact setting. The Griggs
Court held that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practice^."^^ The lower courts in Teamsters, applying the Griggs rationale, found that a competitive seniority system contained in a collective bargaining agreement between the
Teamsters and T.1.M.E.-D.C. violated title VII because it
"locked" minorities into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior discrimination by discouraging transfers to higher paying jobs?
The Supreme Court conceded that "[wlere it not for 5 703(h),
the seniority system in this case would seem to fall under the
Griggs rationale."@' But the Court held that "Congress considered [the perpetuation] effect of many seniority systems and extended a measure of immunity to them."e2 Consequently, for the
89. Id. at 430.
90. 431 US. at 343-46.
91. Id. at 349.
92. Id. at 350. The Court rejected the government's theory that the perpetuation of
prior discrimination through the operation of a race-neutral seniority system constituted
a continuing violation of title VII. Id. at 345-54.
The Court distinguished in its analysis between pre- and post-Act discrimination.
The government had argued that a seniority system which perpetuates the effects of
prior discrimination-pre-Act or post-Act--could never be "bona fide" under 703(h).
The Court noted, however, that post-Act discriminatees could obtain full "make whole"
relief under the Court's prior holding in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976), "without attacking the legality of the seniority system as applied to them." 431
U.S. at 347.
The Court's analysis of the pre- and post-Act issue, as Justice Marshall notes in
dissent, is not based on the legislative history of section 703(h). Id. at 383-84 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part m d dissenting in part). Justice Marshall's contention that the section does not legalize seniority systems which perpetuate post-Act discrimination assumes, however, that Congress intended the A d to pioscribe neutral systems that result
in discriminatory effects. The legislative history is directly to the contrary. As the Justice
Department Memorandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Clark indicates, title VII proscribes unequal treatment, not unequal effects:
Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a
chance for promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man
on the totem pole" he is not being discriminated against because of his race.
Of course, if the seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful
under Title VII. If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before
Any difference in treatany white man, such a rule [would be unlawful]
ment based on established seniority rights would not be based on race and
would not be forbidden by the title.
110 CONG.REC. 7207 (1964) (emphasis added). Accord, id. at 7217 (remarks of Sen.
Clark); id. at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6563-64 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).

....
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first time in a disparate impact context, the Court refused to
implement equal status.
The Court's analysis of the legislative history relied heavily
on several memoranda entered into the Congressional Record in
response to criticism that title VII would destroy existing seniority rights." Although these memoranda were entered before section 703(h) was adopted, the Court found that the chronology of
events leading up to the addition of section 703(h) indicated
that the memoranda were "authoritative indicators of that secThe "unmistakable purpose of 5 703(h)," the
tion's purpo~e."~
Court concluded, "was to make clear that the routine applicat b n of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under
Title VII."96 In light of the purpose exhibited in the legislative
history, the Court rejected arguments that no seniority system
that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimination can be "bona
fide?"' Similarly, it rejected a reading of the words "an intention to discriminate" to mean the effect of the application of a
seniority system rather than the purpose or intent for which it is
used?'
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing that Congress did not expressly consider whether neutral
systems that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination violated the Civil Rights Act. Reading the legislative history very
narrowly, he concluded that the "only evils" that Congress addressed were seniority systems that were fictional or
nonremedial or that had a disparate impact on newly hired miIn United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), handed down on the same day as
Teamsters, the Court rejected a reading of section 703(h) that would immunize attacks
on seniority systems based on the consequences of acts that occurred prior to the enactment of title VII, but would allow such attacks when the consequences resulted from
post-Act discrimination. Id. at 560.
93. 431 US. at 350-51 (interpretative memorandum by Senators Clark and Case);
id. at 351 (interpretative memorandum by Justice Department); id. at 351 n.36 (questions and answers prepared by Sen. Clark).
94. Id. at 352. Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted that the three documents concerning seniority introduced by Senator Clark were written "many weeks" before section
703(h) was introduced: "Accordingly, they do not specifically discuss the meaning of the
proviso." Id. at 382 & n.6 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Court in response, stated that "tilt is inconceivable that 8 703(h), as part of a compromise bill, was intended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's supporters by
increasing Title VII's impact on seniority systems." Id. at 352.
95. Id. at 352.
96. Id. at 353.
97. Id. at 353 11.38. Compare id. at 381 (Marshall, J., dissenting) with Seelman,
supra note 32, at 25 & n.115, 35-36, 51-52.
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nority employees." Since, as the Court acknowledged, " 'there
seem[ed] to be no explicit reference in the legislative history to
pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less desirable jobs,'
[olur task . . . is 'to put to ourselves the question,'which choice
is it the more likely that Congress would have made' had it focused on the pr~blem.''~~
Justice Marshall approached this problem by first examining "the devastating impact" the Court's
holding would have on minority groups. Noting remarks by several legislators, Marshall in effect concluded that Congress
wanted to achieve economic equality-"to enable black workers
to assume their rightful place in society."loO
Justice Marshall bolstered his finding of this congressional
purpose with two post-enactment developments: EEOC interpretations invalidating seniority systems that perpetuate prior
discriminationlol and legislative history accompanying the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.1°2 The materials Justice
Marshall found persuasive included committee reports citing
lower court decisions and law review articles approving the "perpetuation principle."loSIn addition, he cited a canon of statutory
interpretation authorizing reliance on subsequent legislation to
interpret prior legislation on the same subject matter?
In responding to these arguments, the Court disapproved
the use of subsequent legislative interpretations of the 1964 Act:
[Tlhe section of Title VII that we construe here, § 703(h), was
enacted in 1964, not 1972. The views of members of a later
Congress, concerning different sections of Title VII, enacted after this litigation commenced, are entitled to little if any
weight. It is the intent of the Congress that enacted 9 703(h) in
1964, unmistakable in this case, that controls.105

The Court's refusal to extend the Griggs rationale to neutral
98. 431 U.S. a t 385-86 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 386-87 (quoting Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933)).
100. Id. at 389.
101. On this point, Justice Marshall concedes that the Court "may have retreated"
from its prior view that the interpretations of the EEOC are " 'entitled to great deference.'" Id. at 390 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)).
Compare General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), with Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,430-31 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971).
102. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e (1976)).
103. 431 U.S.' at 391-92 & n.21 (dissenting opinion).
104. Id. at 393-94.
105. Id. at 354 n.39.
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systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination, particularly in light of the overwhelming judicial and academic
opinion to the cozitrary,lw reflects a decided deference to the
equal treatment mandate.
4. Albemarle, Franks, and the scope of the remedy under section 706(g): equal treatment or equal status?

Section 706(g), title VII's remedial provision, authorizes a
court to "order such atfirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay."lo7 Congress amended
Section 706(g) in 1972.1°8 Accordingly, the Court relied extensively on the 1972 amendments to construe the section in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. lW
In Albemarle, a class of present and former black employees
sought injunctive relief from the discriminatory effects of the
plant's testing practices and seniority system. Five years after
the complaint was filed, the class moved to add a backpay demand. The district court found that Albemarle's seniority system violated title VII, but refused to order backpay because the
company had not acted in bad faith.l1° The Supreme Court held
that the absence of bad faith is not a sufficient reason for denying backpay. Citing Griggs, the Court noted that "Title VII is
not concerned with the employer's 'good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent' for 'Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation.' "ll1
The Court noted that in amending section 706(g), the Senate rejected several amendments that would have restricted that
section's backpay provision.11a In addition, the Court supported
its reading of the statute with other statements from the legislative history1lSand with contemporaneous interpretations of the
106. See id. at 378-80 and accompanying notes (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
107. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(g) (1976).
108. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(g) (1976)).
109. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
110. Id. at 410.
111. Id. at 422 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971) (emphasis in original)).
112. 422 U.S. at 414 n.8, 420 & n.13.
113. Id.
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National Labor Relations Act's backpay provision,l14after which
section 706(g) was expressly modeled.l1Vhi1e the Court's strict
holding on the backpay issue is not inconsistent with equal
treatment, its reasoning and statutory interpretation were heavily influenced by the Griggs equal status analysis.
In Franks u. Bowman Transportation Co.,l16 the Court held
that persons to whom the defendant had wrongfully denied employment were presumptively entitled to a full competitive, as
well as a benefit, kind of seniority applied retroactively to the
date of their initial job application.l17 Because the plaintiffs in
Franks were individually identified victims of the employer's
discriminatory practices, the Court's holding need not be seen to
violate the principle of equal treatment. As in Albemarle, however, the Court's interpretative approach leaves substantial
doubt that the result was reached by reference to an equal treatment purpose. The misgivings expressed in separate opinions by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell suggest that it was not.
While agreeing that seniority relief should be available, Justice Powell, dissenting in part, did not agree with the Court's
interpretation of section 706(g) as "presumptively" requiring
retroactive seniority relief.l18 He argued that the Court improperly relied on language from and citations to lower court decisions contained in Committee Reports to the 1972 amendments,ll@and he criticized the Court's heavy reliance on Labor
Board practice.laOIn conclusion, Justice Powell insisted that the
Court's approach renders "largely meaningless the discretionary
authority vested in district courts by 8 706(g) to weigh the equities of the situation."lal
114. See 29 U.S.C. 8 160(c) (1976).
115. 422 U S . 419-21 & n.11. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.824, 880-84
(1972).
116. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
117. See id. at 766-70, 779; id. at 782 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 784-86, 788 n.6, 790-91, 796 n.18.
119. Id. at 796 n.18.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 782.
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B. The Equal Status Cases
1. Formulation of a liability theory in disparate impact cases:
Griggs and Albemarle
As the Court's first definitive expression on the nature and
scope of the Civil Rights Act's prohibition of racial discrimination,l" Griggs u. Duke Power Co.12' has profoundly influenced
the development of antidiscrimination law. Blacks in that case
challenged the power company's requirement that applicants
have a high school diploma or pass an intelligence test in order
to be considered for employment or for transfer to higher paying
jobs. The company contended that its testing practices were specifically authorized under section 703(h) of the Civil Rights
Act.lS4Section 703(h) permits employers to use "any professionally developed ability test" that "is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."lS6 The lower courts essentially adopted an equal
treatment interpretation of the Act by holding that job qualification criteria which were fairly applied to all racial groups and
which were implemented without an intent to discriminate
against minority employees would not be invalidated merely because a disproportionate number of minority applicants failed to
satisfy the criteria.lp6
The Supreme Court, however, took an equal status approach. "[Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent" was
essentially irrelevant, inasmuch as "Congress directed the thrust
of the [Civil Rights] Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation."ln Reversing the lower
courts, the Supreme Court formulated a two-part theory of liability for disparate impact cases under title VII. First, the plaintifF had to show that the challenged employment practice had a
disproportionate impact on minority groups. Because the Civil
Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, supra note 14, at 62.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 427-28, 433.
Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-2(h) (1976).
126. 401 U S . at 428-29.
127. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
122.
123.
124.
125.
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Rights Act "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operashowing of disproportionate impact established a
t i ~ n , " la~ ~
prima facie case of liability. Second, the Court held that "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."lge
In establishing the relevance of disproportionate impact evidence to title VII law, the Court reasoned that the objective of
Congress in the enactment of title VII was plain from the lan"It was to achieve equality of employment
guage of the stat*:
opportunities . . .'
"Equality," however, required not
merely race neutral treatment, but race conscious treatment, i.e.,
"the posture and condition of the jobseeker [must] be taken into
Since, as the Court noted, the fact that whites performed better on the tests than blacks "appear[s] to be directly
traceable to race,"lS2 the use of such tests was prima facie
unlawful.
Aside from its interpretation of the legislative objective, the
Court's definition of a prima facie case may have been influenced by the EEOC's construction of the Civil Rights Act.lS3In
its Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,lMthe EEOC
states that "[tlhe use of any test which adversely affects hiring
. . . constitutes discrimination unless . . . the test has been validated."lS5 "[Hligher rejection rates for minority candidates than

.

128. Id. at 431.
129. Id. at 432.
130. Id. a t 429.
131. Id. at 430-31.
132. Id. at 430. The Court found that the disproportionate impact evidence adduced
in the case was directly related to prior societal discrimination.
& W. BENNETT,
supra note 11, a t 11-12; N. GLAZER,
supra
133. See T. EASTLAND
note 11, a t 51-57. See generally Note, Testing for Special Skills in Employment: A New
Approach to Judicial Review, 1976 DUKEL. J. 596; Note, Application of the EEOC
Guidelines to Employment Testing Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public
and Private Employers, 41 GEO.WASH.
L. REV. 505 (1972).
134. 29 C.F.R. g 1607 (1979). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, created by the Civil Righta Act in 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, g 705, 78 Stat. 258 (1964)
(codified a t 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-4 (1976)), was not given authority to promulgate substantive regulations. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976); 42
U.S.C. 5 2000e-12 (1976). The Commission formulated its first set of employment testing
guidelines, without seeking public comment, in 1966. Seelman, supra note 32, at 4 &
n.21. The guidelines were subsequently revised-again without cornmentiin 1970. Id. at
4.
135. 29 C.F.R. 8 1607.3 (1979).
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nonminority candidates" are an indication of "possible discrimination."lS6 Validation requires proof "that the test is predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for
which candidates are being evaluated."lS7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court expressly approved the EEOC's validation requirement.ls8 Relying on the canon that administrative interpretations by an enforcing agency are entitled to "great deference,"
the Court found that the section's language and "legislative history support[ed] the Commission's construction, . . . afford[ing]
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of
Congress."1S@
In Albemarle, the Court refined the Griggs two-step theory
of liability. The Court defined the prima facie case as a showing
by "the complaining party or class . . . that the tests in question
select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants."140In step
136. Id. § 1607.4(a).
137. Id. $ 1607.4(c). In addition to validity, the EEOC also ruled that procedures
having a disparate impact would be deemed to be unlawful unless they "evidence[d] a
high degree of utility" and "the person giving or acting upon the results of the particular
test [could] demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures [were] unavailable for his use." Id. 1607.3. According to Seelman, the EEOC
guidelines do not compare with the statute they interpret. Seelman, supra note 32, at 1039.
138. 401 U.S. at 433 n.9, 436.
139. Id. a t 434. The Court also stated that "[flrom the sum of the legislative history
relevant in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of §
703(h) to require that employment tests be job related comports with congressional intent." Id. at 436.
140. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 US. 405, 425 (1975). Accord, General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125, 136-37 & n.14 (1976). In these cases, the Court essentially
adopted the EEOC standard.
The cases following Griggs and Albemarle suggest that statistical proof alone of adverse impact can establish a prima facie case. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.
136 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). But see Seelman, supra note 32, a t 52 n.232 ("[Wlhether
adverse impact evidence alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination in a case involving the more common kinds of selection factors is still a
question which the Court must decide finally.").
The only authority the Albemarle Court cited in support of its definition of a prima
facie case in a disparate impact context was McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). 422 U.S. at 425. McDonnell Douglas was a disparate treatment case.
Consequently, it did not decide whether evidence of disparate impact establishes prima
facie liability under title VII. The Griggs analysis of 5 703(h) focused on the job-relatedness issue. Relying on the Clark-Case Memorandum, Griggs held that title VII required
the employer to show that the test has "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." 401 U.S. a t 432, 434. The fact that title VII permits employers to use tests
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two, the burden shifts to the employer to show job-relatedness.141 In the event the employer meets this burden, the Court
added a third step: "[Ilt remains open to the complaining party
to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "14'
which measure "applicable job qualifications," id. at 434 n.11, does not mean that a title
VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination merely by showing that proportionately fewer blacks than whites can meet the applicable standards. Indeed, in the
paragraph immediately preceding the one on which the Court relies, Senator Case noted
the following:
Whatever its merit as a socially desirable objective, title VII would not
require, and no court could read title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or
change the occupational qualifications he sets for his employees simply because
proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to meet them. Thus, it
would be ridiculous, indeed, in addition to being contrary to title VII, for a
court to order an employer . . . to lower his requirements . . . because . . .
prior cultural or educational deprivation of Negroes prevented them from
qualifying.
110 CONG.REC.7246-47 (1964). And in the sentence immediately following that quoted
by the Court, the Senator stated that "Title VII would in no way interfere with the right
of an employer to fix job qualifications." Id. at 7247.
However, Senator Clark did not deny that testa might be used as a pretext for racial
discrimination. Yet he emphasized that traditional disparate treatment standards governed such practices. Where "it could be demonstrated that such tests were used for the
purpose of discriminating against an individual because of his race," then the Act would
proscribe their use. "[Ilt is not enough," however, "that the effect of using a particular
test is to favor one group above another, to produce a violation of the act; an act of
discrimination must be taken with regard to an individual, 'because of such individual's
race, color, religion, or national origin.' " Id. at 9107 (emphasis added). See also Seelman,
supra note 32, at 50.
The Court also relied on the fact that Senator Tower's original amendment authorizing " 'professionally developed ability tests' " was rejected because, as Senator Case put
it, it might allow employers to use tests as a "guise" for discrimination. 401 U.S.a t 435
(quoting 110 CONG.REC.13,504 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case)). In opposing the amendment, however, the senators supporting enactment of the civil rights bill did not advocate a change in the traditional burden of proof. See SOVERN,
supra note 30, at 71-73;
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV.
62,71 (1965); Bonfield, supra note 30, at 955-58; Gardner, The Development
of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The Defendant's Views, 26 ALA. L. REV.
1, 55-80 (1973); Lamb, Proof of Discrimination at the Commission Level, 39 TEMP.
L.Q.
299, 301 (1966); Seelman, supra note 32, at 42-62. As Senator Humphrey stated, these
tests "are legal unless used for the purpose of discrimination." 110 CONG.REc. 13504
(1964) (emphasis added).
141. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. a t 425.
142. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). In
Albemarle, the Court also stated that proof of suitable alternative selection criteria
would constitute evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a "pretext" for
discrimination. Id. McDonnell Douglas defined the process of proving pretext as follows:
"In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were
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The liability issue in Albemarle concerned only the question
of what an employer must show "to establish that pre-employment tests . . . are sufficiently 'job related' to survive challenge
under Title VII."14s In answering this question, the Court again
endorsed, virtually without modification, the EEOC's construction of title VII.144
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, warned that
"a too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines" might lead to
"a subjective quota system of employment selection," a result
"far from the intent of Title VII." He suggested that the guidelines deserved only "that deference normally due agency statements based on agency experience and expertise."14'
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, would have accorded even
less deference to the EEOC standards for proving job relatedness: "[S]lavish adherence to the EEOC Guidelines regarding
test validation should not be required; those provisions are, as
their title suggests, guides entitled to the same weight as other
well-founded testimony by experts in the field of employment
testing."146 The Chief Justice also noted that the Griggs endorsement of the guidelines extended only to the proposition
that tests must be demonstrated to be job related under section
703(h), not to the EEOC's "methods for proving job relatedness." The EEOC's definition of test discrimination, he asserted,
"interpret[s] no section of Title VII and [is] nowhere referred to
in its legislative history."147
2. Washington v. Davis: retreat from equal status?
-

In Washington u. Davis,14' police department applicants in
the District of Columbia alleged that Test 21, a test designed to
measure verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension,
had a highly discriminatory impact in screening out black appliin fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." 411 U.S.at 805. Accord, Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977).
In its guidelines, the EEOC placed the burden of showing that "alternative suitable
hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for [the employer's] use" on the
employer. 29 C.F.R. 5 1607.3 (1979). The Court's dictum on the suitable alternative burden appears to have rejected this approach.
143. 422 U.S.at 408.
144. See id. at 430-36.
145. Id. at 449.
146. Id. at 452.
147. Id. at 451-52 (emphasis in original).
148. 426

US. 229 (1976).
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cants and bore no relationship to job performance. The test was
developed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and was generally used throughout the federal service. Plaintiffs claimed
that use of the test violated their fifth amendment rights.14@The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, applying the
Griggs rationale, held that proof of disproportionate impact
alone was sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.150In a
landmark decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
proof of discriminatory purpose was required in actions brought
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.151
The Court appeared to retreat from the wholehearted endorsement it had given the EEOC Guidelines in Albemarle. In
promulgating testing guidelines, the CSC's interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act had consistently tended to implement the equal
treatment principle, while the EEOC's interpretation had
tended toward equal status.lS2 In Washington v. Davis, the
plaintiffs argued that the CSC's test had to meet the job-relatedness standards developed under the EEOC guidelines,15s
which required evidence that test performance relate to success
on the job? The defendants argued, on the other hand, that
the guidelines developed by the CSC, which permitted tests that
predicted "[s]uccess in training,"lS5 were more consistent with
title VI19slegislative intent.lM
The court of appeals, persuaded that the EEOC interpretation was correct, held that the defendants had failed to "satisfy
what it deemed to be the crucial requirement of a direct relationship between performance on Test 21 and performance on
the policeman's job."lS7 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting
149. Id. a t 233-36.
150. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reu'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Although title VII was then inapplicable to the Federal Government, the parties assumed they were subject to Civil Rights Act standards. Washington v. Davis, 428 U.S. a t
238 n.8, 249 & n.15. The extent to which lower courts accepted this assumption is an
indication of the influence Griggs has exerted in the development of antidiscrimination
law. See id. a t 236 & n.6, 237, 238 & n.10, 244 & n.12. See generally Schwemm, From
Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961,987-1000, Burden of Proof, supra note 30, a t 103739.
151. 426 U.S. a t 238-40.
152. See Seelman, supra note 32, a t 3-9, 53-62.
153. See id. at 26.
154. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. a t 265 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id. a t 250 n.16.
156. See id. a t 232 & n.1; Seelman, supra note 32, at 26.
157. 426 U.S. at 249-50.
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that the CSC's guidelines seemed "the much more sensible construction of the job-relatedness requirement."1sa
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that the Court was retreating from its earlier definition of discrimination, noting that
the Court's holding was "distinctly opposed" to the EEOC's construction of title VI1.l" The Court's approach, he charged, contradicted the view of Congress' intent expressed in Griggs and
Albemarle. Deference to the EEOC's interpretation was warranted, he argued, because Congress failed to alter or disapprove
the guidelines in 1972 when it amended title V1I.l6O Finally, in
support of his argument that the Court's interpretation was "inconsistent with clearly expressed Congressional intent," Justice
Brennan relied on committee reports accompanying the 1972
legislation.161
Although it did not purport to modify any Civil Rights Act
precedents, Washington u. Davis represented a significant setback to the complete implementation of the equal status value
in antidiscrimination law. For the time being, a t least, the equal
status tide seemed to be turning.16'
158. Id. a t 249-51. But see Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 & n.15, 334 n.19 (1977).
The EEOC Guidelines came under further attack in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976). In 1972, the EEOC promulgated a regulation requiring employers to
include pregnancy-related disabilities in their employee health and disability insurance
plans. In rejecting this rule, the Court noted that EEOC Guidelines were " 'not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority.' " The weight they should be given is
dependent " 'upon the thoroughness evident in [their] consideration, the validity of
[their] reasoning . . and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.'" Id. a t 142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)). See also Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,719 n.36
(1978).
The Court also rejected the EEOC Guidelines because they conflicted with regulations promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator. See 429 U.S. a t 144-45.
159. 426 U.S. at 266.
160. Id. a t 264. Deference was also due, he argued, because Congress recognized the
need for expert assistance in the area of employment discrimination. Id. a t 264 n.8.
161. Id. a t 268-69.
162. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) significantly retarded the full implementation of equal status.
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court upheld a disability
plan challenged under f 703(a) of title VII, because it excluded disabilities arising from
pregnancy from its coverage. The Court, analyzing Gilbert as a disparate treatment case,
id. a t 133-37, compared f 703(a)'s nondiscrimination prohibition with the fourteenth
amendment's proscription against sex-related discrimination as interpreted in Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). I t noted the "similarities between the congressional language" of f 703(a) and cases construing the fourteenth amendment. I t also noted that

.
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3. Bakke and Weber: reaching the limits of equal status

Although federal agencies had endorsed the concept of preferential treatment as early as the mid-l960'~,l~~
the Court did
not squarely face the issue until 1978 and the case of Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.'" Before Bakke, signals
respecting the Court's view on the controversial reverse discrimination issue had been mixed.le6 The reason for this became apparent in Bakke. Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun concluded that title VI of the Civil Rights Act1did not have independent statutory force, but proscribed only
those racial classifications that would violate the equal protecl~~
for these five justices the ultimate
tion ~ 1 a u s e . Consequently,
because the concerns Congress manifested in enacting title VII were similar to the concerns manifested in the Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court cases "afford an existing body of law" relevant to and helpful in interpreting 5 703(a). 429 U.S. at 133. At one point the Court virtually admitted that Congress
incorporated constitutional (equal treatment) standards into title VII:
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known a t the time of
the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth
Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial
construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate . . . because of. . . sex . . .," without further explanation of its meaning,
we should not readily infer that it meant something different from what the
concept of discrimination has traditionally meant.
Id. a t 145 (citations omitted). Justice Brennan objected to this inference. Id. a t 153-54 &
n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. See generally T. EASTLAND
& W. BENNETT,supra note 11, at 11-12, 133-36.
164. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke has generated considerable commentary. See, e.g.,
Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HAW. L. REV.5 (1978); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural
Fairness, or Structural Justice, 92 HAW. L. REV. 864 (1979); Voros, Three Views of
Equal Protection: A Backdrop to Bakke, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV.25.
165. In the early disparate impact cases, the Court exhibited a willingness to consider the effects of historical discrimination in determining liability under the Civil
Rights Act. See, eg., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. a t 430. In later cases, however,
the Court emphasized that title VII focuses on the individuals, not classes. Los-Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). Moreover, the Court had
decided in 1976 that title VII "proscribes racial discrimination . . . against whites on the
same terms as racial discrimination against non-whites." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Tramp. Co., 427 U.S. at 279.
166. Bakke's original complaint alleged that the University of California's special
admissions program violated title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as well as the equal protection clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the California State Constitution.
While the trial court based its decision on all three grounds, the California Supreme
Court held for Bakke only on equal protection grounds. Consequently, the parties
neither briefed nor argued the applicability of title VI. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
requested the parties and the Justice Department to submit supplementary briefs on the
statutory issue. See A. SINDLER,
ADMISSIONS
259 (1978).
Bakke, DeFunis, AND MINORITY
167. 438 U.S. at 284-87 (Powell, J.); id. a t 328-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
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meaning of the Civil Rights Act was not a question of statutory
interpretation, but one of constitutional interpretation. Of these
five, only Justice Powell's view of the constitution harmonized
with the equal treatment value.168Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist concluded that the Civil
Rights Act "may independently proscribe conduct that the Constitution does not," and therefore expressly adopted an equal
treatment interpretation of the Act?* For these four justices,
the meaning of the Civil Rights Act was a question of statutory
interpretation.
In support of their conclusion that title VI incorporated
nothing more than a constitutional standard, Justices Powell
and Brennan offered two arguments. First, they argued that
"supporters of Title VI repeatedly declared that the bill enacted
constitutional principles."170 Second, they noted that Congress
refused to define the term "discrimination," favoring instead
"broad language that could be shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine."171 Therefore,
Congress intended to delegate to the courts the task of updating
the Act's meaning.
Justice Stevens believed that the language of section 601
was "perfectly clear,"172i.e., "[nlo person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race . be excluded from participation
any program . . receiving Federal financial assisin
t a n ~ e . " lThe
~ ~ university excluded Bakke because of his race. It
received federal financial assistance; therefore, in Justice Stevens' view, "[tlhe plain language of the statute" resolved the issue: "A different result cannot be justified unless that language
misstates the actual intent of the Congress that enacted the
statute . . . ."17' After examining the statute's cbntext,lT6its leg-

...

.

..

and dissenting in part).
168. See id. at 287-305 (Powell, J.).
169. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. 438 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J.); accord, id. at 328-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 337; accord, id. at 286-87 (Powell, J.).
172. Id. a t 414 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000d (1976).
174. 438 U.S. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. "The statutory prohibition against discrimination in federally funded projects
contained in 5 601 is more than a simple paraphrasing of . . . the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment . . . [Section] 601 has independent force, with language and emphasis in
addition to that found in the Constitution." Id. a t 416.
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islative history,176and the Supreme Court's prior interpretations
of the Act, Justice Stevens concluded that nothing justified "the
conclusion that the broad language of 5 601 should not be given
its natural meaning."177 Implicit in Justice Stevens' analysis is
an assumption that the doctrine of separation of powers requires
courts to defer to the policy choices expressed through the democratic process: "As with other provisions of the Civil Rights
Act, Congress' expression of its policy to end racial discrimination may independently proscribe conduct the Constitution does
not."178 He concluded that in such circumstances it was not the
Court's task in interpreting the statute, " 'to consider whether
Congress [in 19641 was mistaken' " in its view of equality;
" '[rlather, we must construe the statute in light of the impressions under which Congress did in fact act.' "17@
Responding to Justice Stevens' analysis, Justice Brennan offered an additional reason for rejecting the argument that Congress intended to enact an independent and "colorblind" rule of
statutory law. His argument proceeded essentially as follows:
First Premise: "The legislative history of Title VI, as well
as the statute itself, reveals a desire to induce voluntary compliance with the requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment."
Second Premise: "[V]oluntary compliance with the requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment" involves "voluntary efforts to eliminate the evil of racial discrimination."
Third Premise: The elimination of the evil of racial discrimination compels the "use of race-conscious remedies to
cure acknowledged or obvious statutory [and constitutional]
violations."
Fourth Premise: An equal treatment "reading of Title VI
would require recipients guilty of discrimination to await
the imposition of [race-conscious] remedies by the Executive
[or Judicial] Branch."
Fifth Premise: "Surely Congress did not intend to . . . [require] the recipient to await a judicial adjudication of [liability] and the judicial imposition of a racially oriented remedy."

...

176. "[Nlothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad language of 5 601 should not be given its natural meaning. We are dealing with a distinct
statutory prohibition, enacted at a particular time with particular concerns in mind;
neither its language nor any prior interpretation suggests that its place in the Civil
Rights Act, won after long debate, is simply that of a constitutional appendage." Id. at
418.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 417.
179. Id. at 416 n.18 (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,709 (1973)).
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Conclusion: Therefore, title VI permits recipients of federal funds to exclude persons on racial grounds from their programs in order to cure acknowledged violations of the Act.lBO

On the face of the argument, it is not apparent that Congress' intent to induce voluntary compliance with title VI's requirement of "nondiscriminatory treatment" (first premise) is
equivalent to an intent to induce individual recipients of federal
funds to grant preferential treatment (second and third premises). Consequently, Justice Brennan simply asserts that the two
are equivalent (fifth premise). In essence, Justice Brennan's voluntary compliance argument does no more than beg the ultimate
question-what did Congress intend?
In the final analysis, Justice Brennan's interpretative approach rests on a presumption that "remedial statutes designed
to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities" contain an
equal status purpose.181 Therefore, whenever a literal application
of the statutory language would lead to results directly contrary
to this purpose, that application "must fail."18' Concededly, his
formulation of purpose is not without support, particularly in
the sources on which he relies most heavily-judicial decisions
and executive and congressional action subsequent to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act.lSS In this respect, Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke, more than any of the Civil Rights Act
decisions to date, contains a fully elaborated application of an
interpretative theory involving contemporaneous construction.lM
180. 438 U.S. at 336-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Contrary to Justice Brennan's equal status approach, Justice Powell argued that abrogation of equal treatment's due process limitations would "convert a remedy heretofore
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the
Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination." Id. a t 310. See also id. a t 296 & n.36. Cf. United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218-19 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Voluntary compliance"
not equivalent to preferential treatment).
181. 438 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Id. a t 340. In formulating the purpose of the Act, Justice Brennan relies heavily
on subsequent congressional and executive action. See id. at 341-50. The conclusion that
the Act authorizes preferential treatment follows automatically from the assumption that
it embodies an equal status value. See id. a t 336, 366-68 & n.42.
183. Id. a t 341-55.
184. Contemporaneous construction techniques were also utilized by some justices
in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 390-94 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 154-60 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 268-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-70 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418-23,433-36 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-
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Justice Brennan also utilized a presumption favoring equal
status in United Steelworkers v. Weber.la6Weber, a white production worker, challenged an affirmative action plan included
in a master collective bargaining agreement entered into by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America. The plan required that at least fifty percent
of the trainees accepted into Kaiser's craft training program be
black. Since trainees were selected by seniority, the plan required the maintenance of separate seniority lists for black and
white workers. Consequently, several of the most junior black
trainees selected for the program had less seniority than several
white production workers whose bids for admission were reBrennan, writing for the Court, noted that secj e ~ t e d Justice
.~
tions 703(a) and (d) of title VII "make it unlawful to 'discriminate . . . because of . . race' in hiring and in the selection of
apprentices for training programs." However, because "a literal
interpretation" would conflict with the "purpose of the stat~ t e , " 'Justice
~ ~ Brennan relied on the "rule that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its make r ~ . "The
~ ~Court
~ found that the purpose of the statute was to
promote the "integration of blacks into the mainstream of
American society."18@This could be accomplished through voluntary race-conscious efforts to improve the " 'relative position
of the Negro worker' " in American society.leOThe Court bolstered its finding of purpose by examining the language and legislative history of Section 703(j),lB1which analysis essentially
follows Justice Brennan's voluntary compliance argument in
Bakke.
Justice Blackmun, concurring, virtually admitted that the
Court's interpretation abrogated the legislative "bargain struck
when Title VII was enacted"lB" by lowering the threshold for

.

-

-

- -

34 (1971).
185. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
546, 554-56 (1979).
186. 443 U.S. at 199.
187. Id. at 201-02.
188. Id. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892)).
189. Id. at 202.
190. Id. (quoting 110 CONG.REC.6547 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
191. Id. at 204-08.
192. Id. at 213.
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permissible remedial treatment and expanding the measure of
the remedy even beyond the bounds established in the Court's
prior holdings. Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun joined the
Court's opinion as well as its judgment in the belief that "additional considerations, practical and equitable, only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, support the conclusion reached by the Court."lB8
The Court measured an individual's elibigility for preferential treatment, Justice Blackmun observed, "solely in terms of a
statistical disparity."lW Employers would be authorized under
the Court's formula to prefer minorities whenever a job category
had been "traditionally segregated."lM According to Justice
Blackmun,
the Court considers a job category to be "traditionally segregated" when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity between the proportion of blacks in the labor
force and the proportion of blacks among those who hold jobs
within the category.lB6

In other words, mere evidence of statistical disparity conclusively authorized remedial measures.lm Even the cases following
Griggs, which indicate that disparate impact evidence alone may
establish a prima facie case of liability,lMdid not go this far.
Moreover, as Justice Blackmun observed, the Court further reduced the threshold by allowing disparate impact to be proved
by comparison of the composition of the employer's workforce
with "the composition of the labor force as a whole, in which
minorities are more heavily represented," rather than the traditional requirement of a comparison with the composition of the
pool of workers who meet valid job qualifications.lBB
In addition, Justice Blackmun commented, the Court expanded the scope of the statute's remedial provisions by authorizing remedial measures that lie "wholly outside the bounds of
193. Id. at 209. Justice Blackmun advocates a theory of "arguable violations" which
would allow an employer to institute preferential treatment "whether or not a court . .
could order the same step as a remedy." Id.
194. Id. at 213.
195. Id.; see id. at 209 & n.9.
196. Id. at 212.
197. Id. at 212-15.
198. See note 140 supra.
199. 443 U.S.at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

.
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Title VIL"200For example, under the Court's holding, preferential treatment may be afforded on the basis of discrimination
which entirely predates the Act,M1 notwithstanding the Court's
prior cases holding that title VII provides no remedy for pre-Act
dis~rimination.~~~
More significantly, however, the Court for the
first time under the statute upheld the principle of preferential
treatment.'OS Trainees selected for Kaiser's craft program were
not identified victims of discrimination, but were selected solely
because of membership in the disadvantaged class.204
Justice Blackmun attempted to allay misgivings about the
Court's statutory interpretation by noting that "if the Court has
misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because
the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it
so chooses."20s Chief Justice Burger suggested, however, that in
failing to defer to the legislative will, the Court had exceeded the
limits of its constitutional a u t h ~ r i t y . ' ~
The Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist charged, in essence, that in order to achieve
"what it regards as a desirable result,"207the Court read into the
Civil Rights Act a "purpose" entirely at variance with the purpose as conceived by the 88th Congress.208Justice Rehnquist described these two conflicting purposes-the contemporary purpose as conceived by the Court and the original congressional
purpose-as follows:
There is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion
of equality than the numerus clausus-the quota. Whether described as "benign discrimination" or "affirmative action," the
racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
203. See 443 U.S. a t 225 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. a t 363-66 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (upholding preferential treatment under fourteenth amendment).
204. See 443 U.S. at 198-99.
205. Id. a t 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
206. Id. a t 218 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The Court reaches a result I would be
inclined to vote for were I a Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of
Title VII. I cannot join the Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary to the
explicit language of the statute and arrived a t by means wholly incompatible with longestablished principles of separation of powers." Id. a t 216.
207. Id. a t 216. The Court, according to the dissenters, in effect concluded that
adopting an equal status interpretation of title VII was the only "fair" interpretation of
the Act.
208. Id. a t 230-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sword that must demean one in order to prefer another. In
passing Title VII Congress outlawed all racial discrimination,
recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, that
no action disadvantaging a person because of his color is
afJirmative.*Og

The interpretative approach urged by the dissent relies
principally on the language of the statute. Justice Rehnquist, for
example, cited the rule that " '[wlhen words are free from doubt
they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn . . from any extraneous source.""1° Consequently, legislative history provides only secondary evidence of
congressional intent, and then principally to resolve difficulties
caused by "imprecise drafting or because legislative compromises have produced genuine ambiguities."211 This approach
accords with Justice Stevens' interpretation of title VI in Bakke,
which reached a similar equal treatment interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act. In these two most recent pronouncements by
the Court, where the inclination to expand the reach of the
equal status value has appeared more strongly than before, the
division over the proper interpretative approach to the Civil
Rights Act has been the most dramatic.

.

Principles of statutory construction influence the definition
of substantive rights guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act in
much the same way the Court's equal protection analysis defines
the scope of the substantive rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment.212 Unlike the field of constitutional law,
however, "we lack a fully developed, modern theory of the judicial role in interpreting statutes."21s As one commentator has
noted:
209. Id. at 254.
210. Id. at 228 n.9 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U S . 470, 490 (1917)).
211. Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that he had examined the legislative history in order to "expose the magnitude of the Court's misinterpretation of Congress' intent." Id. at 231. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
212. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAW. L. REV.1 (1972).
213. Gerwirtz, The Courts, Congress, and the Executive Policymaking: Notes on
Three Doctrines, 40 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB.46, 65 (1976). See also 2A C. SANDS,STATUTES
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
§ 45.13 (4th ed. 1973).
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Such a theory, of course, would inquire into the various ways
courts identify legislative purpose by examining text, legislative history, etc. But it would also identify, evaluate and propose policies, external to the legislative purpose identified from
text and immediate context, which enter into the judicial activity of interpretation-policies which shape the meaning given
to a statute even when those policies cut somewhat against the
legislative purpose narrowly defined. That such external policies (sometimes embodied in so-called canons or principles of
statutory construction) do influence the construction given
. ,9214 .
statutes cannot be doubted

.. .

Although not always expressly articulated, it is apparent in the
cases reviewed above that certain external policies have influenced the construction of the Civil Rights Act. Professor
Neuborne suggests that these policies are "determined by reigning political theory."21s These policies become apparent in reviewing the characteristic interpretative approaches adopted by
the Court's equal status and equal treatment advocates. This is
the subject of part A below. Part B indicates how the conflicting
policies summarized in part A rest on competing assumptions
about the roles of the legislature and judiciary in formulating
civil rights policy.
A. Interpreting the Civil Rights Act: Original Versus
Current Understanding
1. Ascertaining the original understanding

The most distinctive feature of the interpretative approach
exhibited in the equal treatment opinions is a decided deference
to the intentions of the original draftsmen. This is not determined solely, nor even primarily, by reference to the legislative
history, since the same parts of it are sometimes cited by members of the Court to support conflicting conclusions about the
Civil Rights Act's meaning.m6 Rather, the language and structure of the statute is foremost in the analysis of the equal treatment proponents. This was particularly apparent in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Weber, which relied on the canon, de214. Gerwirtz, supra note 213, at 65.
215. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555 n.32.
216. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 286 (Powell, J.); id. at
332-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 418 n.21 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting statement by Sen. Humphrey, 110
CONC.REC.6544 (1964)).
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scribed in Caminetti u. United States, that "the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'%''
References to the "plain meaning" or "plain language" of
the statute were made by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in WebeP8 and by Justice Stevens in Bakke."@ Their
analysis reveals, however, that they were not referring to the socalled "rule of literal meaning" under which "a judge puts on
blinders, so to speak, in order to obscure from view everything
but just the text of the statute whose effect on the matter at
issue is in question."220On the contrary, their approach seeks to
ascertain and apply the meaning intended by the legislature,
even though another interpretation might be more desirable or
confer greater benefits on the statute's intended beneficiarie~.~~'
This is accomplished not merely by examination of the immediately applicable section, but by reference to the section's statutory context. Justice Powell made the point in Franks, for example, that read alongside other sections of title VII, the language
of section 706(g) indicates that competitive-type seniority
should not be granted indi~criminately.~'~
Another feature of this approach is the reluctance to give
great weight to subsequent interpretations made by administrative agencies, legislative committees, or courts whose views do
not comport with the statute's original meaning. Justice Blackmun, for example, objected in Albemarle to "the Court's apparent view that absolute compliance with the EEOC Guidelines is
a sine qua non of pre-employment test validation."228 In addition, Chief Justice Burger charged that the Court misapplied
Griggs in according the guidelines " 'great deference.' "224 Similar skeptical treatment of administrative interpretations was ex217. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
218. 443 U.S. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219. 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id.
at 414 (language of section "is perfectly clear"); id. at 418 (meaning of statute "is crystal
clear") (language should be given its "natural meaning").
supm note 213, 8 46.02.
220. 2A C. SANDS,
221. See R. DICKERSON,
THEINTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES
231-32
(1975).
222. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 791-93 & n.9 (1976).
223. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
224. Id. a t 451-52 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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hibited by Justice Powell in Franks,226by the Court in Teams t e r ~ , "and
~ by Justice Stevens in Bakke.la7Likewise, in Franks
and Teamsters, equal treatment proponents gave short shrift to
legislative materials generated in 1972 which purported to modify or reinterpret the 1964 Act.22s In Teamsters, for instance,
notwithstanding over thirty decisions by six courts of appeals to
the contrary, the Court refused to extend the Griggs rationale to
alleviate the discriminatory effects that resulted from the utilization of a bona fide seniority system.229
2. Assigning the current understanding

Reliance on postenactment developments is one of the most
distinctive features of the interpretative approach that characterizes an equal status analysis. The principal materials and canons that have been relied on to support an equal status interpretation of the Civil Rights Act are administrative
interpretations, reenactment after contemporaneous interpretation, legislative silence as implied approval of a contemporaneous interpretation, legislative interpretations of prior enactments, interpretation by reference to related statutes, and
equity of the statute.
a. Administrative interpretations. Section 602 of title
VIaSOand section 713 of title VIIaS1authorized certain federal
departments and agencies to issue regulations to "effectuate"
and "carry out" respective provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
These delegations were bitterly contested by certain members of
Congres~,'~~
who accurately predicted that the agencies would
225. 424 U.S. 747, 796-99 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
226. The majority of the Court in Teamsters ignored Justice Marshall's citation to
"an unbroken line of cases" in which the EEOC had concluded that "Q 703(h) did not
immunize seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." 431 U.S.
a t 378-80 & n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. 438 U.S. 265, 418 n.22 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
228. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 796 n.18 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. See 431 U.S. 324, 378 & n.2 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. 42 U.S.C. Q 2000d-1 (1976).
231. Id. Q 2000e-12 (1976).
232. See, e.g., 110 CONC.REC.5253 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); id. a t 586365 (remarks of Sen. Eastland); id. a t 5606-7 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
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exceed the congressional intent in implementing the "objectives
of the ~ t a t u t e . " ~ ~ ~ e g u l a t and
i o n sdecisions promulgated by two
agencies in particular have played a prominent role in the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act: those of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and those of the EEOC.
In Bakke, Justice Brennan relied extensively on HEW regulations that were promulgated in 1973.2MThe regulations provide that recipients of federal funds "may properly give special
consideration to race, color, or national origin to make the benefits of its program more widely available to such groups, . .
[elven in the absence of .
prior discrirninati~n."~~~
These
views, Justice Brennan argued, as well as the views of the Solicitor General, who was charged by the President with enforcement
powers under title VI, "are entitled to considerable deference in
construing" the statute.286
HEW regulations were also heavily relied upon in Lau v.
Nichols,237a title VI disparate impact case challenging the San
Francisco school system's failure to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry. The Court held, on
the basis of the regulation, that since the failure to provide language instruction had the effect of discriminating between English-speaking and Chinese-speaking students, the Board of Education was obligated under title VI to correct the deficiency.'=
Significantly, in Bakke, Justice Brennan cited Lau for the proposition that title VI allows the voluntary use of race to remedy
"the lingering effects of past societal discriminati~n."~~~
The Court also gave substantial deference to EEOC interpretations of title VII in Griggs, Albemarle, and Dothard v.
R a w l i n ~ o n .In
~ ~ ~addition, Justices Brennan and Marshall
strongly objected to the Court's failure to defer to the EEOC's
point of view in General Electric Co. u. Gilbertu1 and

..

.

233. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 244 n.23 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
234. See 438 U.S. a t 341-45 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. 45 C.F.R. $8 80.3(b)(6)(ii), 80.5Cj) (1979).
236. 438 U.S. at 342, 345 n.19 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
237. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See generally D. H o ~ o w ~THE
n , COURTS
AND SOC~AL
POLICY,15-17 (1977).
238. 414 U.S. at 567-69.
239. 438 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
241. 429 U.S. 125, 155-58 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Teamst
b. Reenactment after contemporaneous interpretation.
Congress expanded the EEOC's enforcement powers in 1972, authorizing it to prevent unlawful employment practices as defined
in sections 703 and 704 of the 1964 Act.24sJustice Marshall argued in Teamsters that Congress "effectively re-enacted [sections 703 and 7041 and the judicial gloss that had been placed on
them."244He referred specifically to lower court decisions finding
that seniority systems which perpetuated the effects of past discrimination were unlawful. Of course, as Justice Marshall's use
of the word "virtually" implies, Congress did not "re-enact" title
VII's prohibiting sections in the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act. It amended them, adding "applicants" for employment and union membership to the persons protected under
section 703, and adding "joint labor-management committees
controlling . . . training programs" to those subject to the
prohibitions of section 704. In Albemarle, the Court utilized the
reenactment canon in determining that "backpay may be
awarded on a class basis under Title VII without exhaustion of
administrative procedures by the unnamed class members."246
There, however, Congress had expressly reenacted title VII's
backpay provision.246
c. Legislative silence as implied approval of a contemporaneous interpretation. Justice Brennan cited the rule in Bakke
that "the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution is particularly deserving of respect where Congress has
directed its attention to the administrative construction and left
it unaltered."247 Justice Brennan noted that in 1977 Congress
considered an amendment to the HEW appropriations bill
which would have restricted the remedial use of race in federal
programs. However, the amendment "did not challenge the right
of federally funded educational institutions to voluntarily extend preference to racial minorities."248Therefore, he concluded,
242. 431 U.S. 324, 390-91 (1977) (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
243. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, $ 5, 86 Stat. 107
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-6(c), (d), (e) (1976)).
244. 431 U.S.324, 393 n.24 (1977) (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See 2A C. SANDS,
supra note 213, 5 49.09.
245. 422 U.S. 405,414 n.8 (1975).
246. Id.
247. 438 US. at 346 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248. Id. at 347.
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HEW'S construction of title VI as permitting voluntary racial
preferences is "particularly deserving of respect."249
d. Legislative interpretations of prior enactments. In
Franks,aS0 Tearn~ters,'~~
and B ~ k k e . " ~Justices Brennan and
Marshall relied on statements from Senate, House, and Conference Committee Reports accompanying the 1972 amendments to
title VII. However, these statements do not imply that the later
Congress shared the same state of mind as the former. For example, the House Report states:
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employment discrimination
tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distinguishable
events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some
identifiable individual or organization . . . .
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far
more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar
with the subject generally describe the problem in terms of
"systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional

One Senator voiced the general intention that equal status interpretations be made of the Act, noting, for example, that "in any
areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was
assumed that the present case law . . . would continue to govern
the applicability and construction of Title VII.''254
e. Interpretation by reference to related statutes. Justice
Brennan argued in Bakke that Congress' decision in 1977 to require federal agencies to set aside ten pecent of all federal public
work project funds for minority business enterprises "reflects a
congressional judgment that the remedial use of race is permissible under Title V1.''s66 And in Franks he cited extensively to
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).'"
In that case, however, the evidence was clear that Congress
modeled title VII's remedial provision after section 10(c) of the
NLRA.
Id. at 346.
424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976).
431 U.S. at 391-93 (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
438 U.S. at 353 n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
118 CONG.REC.7166 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams read into the record).
255. 438 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. 424 US. 747, 768-70 (1976).

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
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f. Equity of the statute. In addition to the postenactment
developments summarized above, the equal status principle received substantial reinforcement in Weber and in Justice Brennan's Bakke opinion from the equity of a statute doctrine.267
The Court stated the rule as follows: "[A] thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers."268
It is true that a statute's context may indicate "a legislative
purpose that is broader than the literal import of the words
used."25@In such cases, however, the meaning of the statute is
broadened "only so far as the words have enough semantic leeway to carry the broadened meaning. Beyond that, the legislative purpose remains unrealized."260Even if the context shows
that the statute was intended to reach beyond the semantic limits of the words used, "[m]erely manifesting a broader legislative
purpose is not enough."261In other words, "determination of the
equity or [spirit of a statute] involves an original problem of
statutory interpretation for which all of the rules of construction
may be useful."262It is insdcient to merely assign a purpose
and to apply it to the case at hand. Such an approach is tantamount to judicial lawmaking.

B. Civil Rights Policy: Legislative Versus Judicial
Supremacy
Article I of the Constitution declares: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States
. ."26s Thus, in addition to its historical and ideological
roots:"
the principle of legislative supremacy is expressly enshrined in the Constitution. It is true that since Marbury u.
Madison266at least, the judiciary has asserted its power to "say
what the law is."266Therefore, in this limited sense, the judiciary

..

257. R. DICKERSON,
supra note 221, at 213-15; 2A C. SANDS,supra note 213,s 54.06.
258. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
R. DICKERSON,
supra note 221, at 215.
Id.
Id.
2A C . SANDS,
supra note 213, § 54.07.
U.S. CONST.art. I, $1.
See R. DICKERSON,
supra note ,221, at 8 n.3.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
Id. at 177.
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exercises a legislative function.267 That Congress' legislative
power is not exclusive, however, "in no wise detract[s] from the
simple assertion that, within [constitutional limitations], any
conflict between the legislative will and the judicial will must be
resolved in favor of the former."P68It is particularly significant,
in the context of a discussion about equality, to note that the
fundamental purpose underlying the separation of powers doctrine is the maintenance of liberty.
The implications of separation of powers in the statutory
context are clear. If legislative supremacy in the creation of law
is to be maintained, Professor Dickerson notes, "cognition" must
precede "creation." Cognition involves the ascertainment of
meaning; creation involves the assignment of meaning, or judicial lawmaking. "That differentiation is hard and the area of uncertainty wide offers no exemption from what appears to be a
clear constitutional mandate."26e Notwithstanding the preeminent position the legislature had traditionally held under our
system of government in formulating social policy, various arguments have been advanced justifying an expanded judicial role
in implementing egalitarian principles. Believing that the courts
are more able and ready to advance the cause of equality, egalitarian theorists would institute a presumption favoring judicial
creation, or lawmaking, in the interpretation of civil rights legislation, which would effectively replace legislative with judicial
supremacy in the promulgation of civil rights policy.
1. Impossibility of ascertaining legislative intent

"[Mlany respectable scholars" have endorsed the notion
that legislative intent is irrelevant, or that it does not exist at
all.270Consequently, the argument is made that it is unrealistic
to derive from the legislative materials anything more than a
"broad philosophical concept." It is presumed that because civil
rights legislation generally embodies a "legislatively expanded
vision of constitutional values," a presumption favoring application of this broad concept would operate in the same fashion as
267. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 13-28.
268. Id. at 8.
269. Id. at 20-21.
270. Id. at 68 n.4. Professor Radin has stated that legislative intention is "undiscoverable in any real sense" because "the chances that of several hundred men each will
have the same determinate situation in mind . . . are infinitesimally small." Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 W v . L. REV.863, 870 (1930).
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the "doctrine of clear statement" operates in constitutional law.
In other words, the presumption of a broad civil rights policy
such as equal status could be rebutted only by an explicit manifestation of legislative intent indicating a narrower policy.271
Justice Brennan adopted this approach in Bakke and Weber,
justifying his application of the statute's ostensible "core purpose" with his view that the legislature had not "unequivocally
ordered [him] not to."272
While the concept of legislative intent has been frequently
criticized, it has continued to have faithful adherents in the judiciary as well as in academia. In fact, Sutherland notes the
following:
An almost overwhelming majority of judicial opinions on statutory issues are written in the idiom of legislative intent. The
reason for this doubtless lies in an assumption that an obligation to construe statutes in such a way as to carry out the will
. . . of the lawmaking branch of the government is mandated
by principles of separation of powers.27s

For this reason, a more careful examination of the concept is
needed before rejecting it out of hand.
According to Professor Dickerson, "intent" refers
to the actual intent of some human being, or group of human
beings, respecting what he or they intended to say. It reflects
the user's expectation that the reader or hearer will take the
language as referring to what the user had in mind. It is, therefore, the specific message that the user intended to convey.274

In reality, "legislative intent" is a figure of speech. Intention is a
state of 'mind. Since only individuals, not legislatures, have
minds, legislatures cannot have "intentions." Therefore, what is
meant by legislative intent is not the collective attitude or view
of a group of legislators, but the intention of a few members of
the group, which is imputed to the rest who are engaged in the
271. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555 & n. 33.
272. Id. at 554.
273. 2A C. SANDS,supra note 213, 8 45.05.
With respect to ascertaining title VII's meaning, Mr. Vaas has noted that "[s]eldom
has similar legislation been debated with greater consciousness for the need for 'legislative history' or with greater care in the making thereof, to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law." Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.L.
REV. 431, 444 (1966).
supra note 221, at 69.
274. R. DICKERSON,
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legislative process.876
This conception of legislative intention "seems to make its
discovery near impossible."876The realities of the legislative process, however, make intent less obscure than appears. As Professor Bennett indicates:
Most legislation is shaped by only a few legislators. The device
of imputed purpose allows legislative purpose to be defined by
the purposes of those few. The common use of committee reports or statements by sponsors of legislation is justifiable on
this basis. The legislation itself may state one or more purposes. Even if none is stated, given what will typically be the
common understanding of its social and economic context, the
words of the legislation will be highly probative not only of legislator goals but even of background attitudes.277

Therefore, intent need not be confined to evidence of individual
legislators' subjective designs. Intention may be derived from
"objective" indicia as well, such as the statutory text and
context.a78
However, even assuming that statutory meaning cannot be
ascertained by reference to legislative intent, the separation of
powers issue remains. If in proposing that the courts be guided
by "a broad philosophical concept," the critics of intent intend
to rely on another method for discerning the legislative will,
then the objection is merely semantic. Surely the constitutional
requirement that cognition precede creation is satisfied by any
reliable indicia of the statute's meaning.279If by their criticism,
the critics suggest that the legislative will is altogether irrelevant, they face the insuperable task of reconciling their suggestion with the constitutional provision of legislative supremacy.
What the criticism implies, however, is that because of the nature of the democratic process, legislatures are not capable of
resolving the controversial issues that typically arise in formulating civil rights policy.880Therefore, legislation should be inter275. See Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF.L. REV. 1049, 1071 (1979).
276. Id. at 1072.
277. Id. at 1073.
supra note 213, $5 47.01-.20.
278. See generally 2A C . SANDS,
supra note 221, at 79-85.
279. See R. DICKERSON,
280. Professor Neuborne notes that a legislature "does not and cannot foresee,
much less resolve, the myriad questions which must arise whenever a broad philosophical proposition is applied to the protean complexity of everyday life." Neuborne, supra
note 185, at 553 (emphasis added).
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preted essentially as a mandate to the courts to resolve these
issues.
2. Legislative competence to deal with civil rights issues

The argument that the legislative branch cannot competently protect the civil rights of individuals takes several forms:
first, Congress cannot possibly foresee every conceivable contingency in formulating a statutory standard; second, the realities
of the political process require that certain issues, even if foreseen, must be compromised or avoided altogether in order to insure passage of the legislation.281
Almost all legislation is prospective in nature and the occurrence of unforeseen events is almost always inevitable. This fact
alone, nevertheless, would not warrant a presumption favoring
judicial policymaking in the civil rights field. Moreover, a statute's sweep is not necessarily frozen as of the date of enactment.282The meaning of a particular word or series of words
need not be limited to a specific object or denotation, but may
be directed toward general ideas or connotations. Therefore, the
meaning of a statute may provide ample flexibility for meeting
future needs without abrogating separation of powers. Legislatively created civil rights and remedies are distinct and independent of constitutional right and remedies. Therefore, considerations which, in the constitutional context, arguably justify an
interpretative mode freed from the constraints of the "original
intention" have considerably less force in a statutory context.
The fact that courts may more efficiently implement civil rights
policy does not warrant setting aside the balances struck by
Congress in this area.
3. Disruption of contemporary expectations

The views of legislators concerning certain legislation may
change over time: "Initially, legislation may have been passed
with one purpose or set of purposes, but may remain on the statute books at any given time for another."28s In other words, it is
conceivable that a current nonrepeal purpose varies from the
original purpose for which the statute was enacted? In addi281.
282.
283.
284.

Bennett, supra note 275, at 1091; Neuborne, supra note 185, at 553-54.
R. DICKERSON,
supra note 221, at 127-28, 130.
Bennett, supra note 275, at 1074.
Id. at 1092.
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tion, popular understanding of the meaning of a statute may
conflict with the intention of the original framers. Consequently,
"[tlhere will usually be some disruption, and perhaps a large
quantum of disappointed expectations, if the current understanding is rejected."28s In response to objections that the "rule
of law" requires adherence to the original intention, proponents
of an expanded judicial role in the interpretation of civil rights
statutes answer as follows: "[Vliews of 'law' change just as do
those about all aspects of human culture. Perhaps nothing is
more likely to change views about 'law' than recurrent disappointment of current expectations caused by adherence to an
older view.''aM Even if the intention of the original draftsmen is
known, these factors, it is argued, present sufficient justification
for allowing the current understanding to prevail.
Professor Bennett recognized the practical difficulties involved in interpreting legislation in terms of an inferred
nonrepeal purpose. "[I]ndifference or inertia" as well as changed
purposes may motivate nonrepeal. Moreover, nonrepeal is a nonaction and therefore need leave no "trace of its motivation."
Furthermore, "nonrepeal requires no vote." Therefore "the justification for imputing the purpose of one legislator to another
. . . is also considerably weaker than in the case of original passage." Consequently, Bennett would employ "a strong but not
irrebuttable presumption that a statute's original purpose remains its contemporary purpose."m7
Measuring the meaning of statutes by an inferred purpose
or by current expectations not only presents serious difficulties
of proof, but raises significant questions about the limits of judicial policymaking. Professor Dickerson illustrates these concerns
as follows:
To read statutes against current, rather than original, usage and environment would subject statutory meanings to uncontrolled and often capricious circumstance. Where the vagaries of usage and environment happened to produce results that
were more congenial to current notions of public policy, a court
would be tempted to take the present as a base. But what
should it do where the results were less congenial? Or should
the courts say that they will reflect current conditions where
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1074.
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they like the result and reject them where they do not?aee

The argument that statutes should be interpreted in light of
contemporary standards also raises fundamental questions about
the respective roles of court and legislature. The argument implies that failure to adhere to current notions of public policy
may undermine the rule of law. Arguably, in the constitutional
context, where the amendment process often makes changes in
the law dificult, this concern may have some relevance?@ But in
a statutory context, widespread disappointment with the results
produced by faithful adherence to the original purpose of the
law will prompt a change in the law. That, in any case, should be
the presumption in a democratic society. Adherence to a contrary presumption is likely to result in a loss of faith in the rule
of law.2wIf there is not sufticient popular pressure to change the
law through the democratic process, what justifies a change
through nondemocratic processes? As Professor Dickerson
warned:
To [those] who believe that it is more wholesome to meet
the needs of the future than to honor the dead past, we may
reply that, because legislation is almost always pointed to the
future, intended future results cannot be assured unless the
historical event that an enactment immediately becomes is
later honored by the courts. This means honoring the legislative past. To do otherwise would substitute the courts for the
legislature in the lawmaking pr~cess.~"

Dickerson suggests that faithfulness to original intention
does not necessarily remove all room for judicial response to
changing circumstances and attitudes."- Nevertheless, the cognitive function is admittedly limited. If it "fails to produce an
adequate result," Dickerson concludes, "the responsibility for
correcting the matter is the legislature's, not the
Resped for the democratic process also means that legislative intent not culminating in an enactment "may be generally ignored;
288. R. DICKERSON,
supra note 221, at 126.
289. Bennett, supra note 275, at 1092-94.
BY JUDICIARY
409-12 (1977); D.
290. See generally R. BERGER,GOVERNMENT
Ho~owrrz,THECOURTS
AND SOCIAL
POLICY
17-21, 33-56 (1977).
291. R. DICKERSON,
supra note 221, at 130. See also Kernochan, Statutory InterpreL.J. 333, 345 (1976).
tation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE
supra note 221, at 127-29.
292. R. DICKERSON,
293. Id. at 129.
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so may postenactment changes in the relevant context."294Consequently, Dickerson rejects the idea that failure to amend statutes the courts have interpreted indicates legislative approval of
the judicial interpretation. Likewise, subsequent legislative history indicating approval of judicial interpretations is entitled to
little weight in interpreting a prior enactment. Reenactment of
prior legislation may enhance the evidentiary weight of contemporaneous interpretations or intervening judicial or administrative interpretations. Where the legislature retains the original
language, however, the presumption is strong that it also intends
to retain the original on text.'^
4. Protection of minority rights

Courts historically have assumed responsibility for protecting minority rights. Since civil rights legislation is designed to
protect minority groups, it is argued that the judiciary should be
given broad power to construe civil rights legislation in furtherance of this remedial goal, much as the courts have wide discretion to construe constitutional provisions.le6 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the judiciary, as a
nonrepresentative body, is better able to protect minority interests than the legislature. Therefore, by enacting broad remedial
measures, Congress should be presumed to have delegated to the
courts the power to construe the legislation as broadly as current
circumstances require?
However, the notion that a democratic system tends to
favor the interests of "some undifferentiated majority" at the
expense of discrete minorities has recently come under sharp
criticism.as@
One widely accepted theory views legislation as "the
outcome of a pure power struggle . . among narrow interest or
pressure group^."^@@ Under this "new realism about the political
process," as Professor Posner describes it, "the very distinction
between 'minority' and 'majority' disappears.'w00If, as Professor

.

294. I d at 126.
295. Id. at 179-83.
296. See Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555 n.32.
297. Id.
298. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP.CT. REV.1, 30-31.
299. Id. at 27. For a review of the literature on the "interest group" theory of legislation, see id. at 27 11.50.
300. Id. at 28, 30. See also Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB.L. REV.197,
212 (1976).
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Posner suggests, government by interest group "is an inevitable
. . . feature of our society," for a court to undo what the process
yields would "condemn as unconstitutional the most characteristic product of a democratic (perhaps of any) political system."s01
5. Legislative veto

It is frequently remarked in the literature on judicial review
that statutory decisions are more easily overturned than constitutional decisions.s02This fact is offered to justify expansive interpretations that "err" in favor of minorities.80s However, as
pointed out earlier, this fact may also justify faithful adherence
to the legislative will. Even conceding that erroneous statutory
decisions are easier to revise, usurpation is no less usurpation
because it appears in a statutory context. Moreover, our system
is no less immune from the institutional erosion that inevitably
accompanies judicial overreaching because the object of usurpation is statutory rather than c o n s t i t u t i ~ n a l . ~ ~

IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the underlying premise of all the arguments for an
interpretative mode that favors judicial creativity in the civil
rights field is the feeling that if equal status is to be fully implemented in our society, the courts must do it. That is precisely
the point. The deplorable conditions that gave impetus to the
inexorable advance of egalitarianism are abating."06 More importantly, the implementation of equal status results in unequal
treatment. The immediate concerns that gave rise to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 have long since been superseded by more ambitious goals-goals that arguably have little if anything to do
with "minorities."
The legislature has not proven powerless in achieving social
justice.s0. Nor has the idea of equality historically proven so un301. Id. at 28. " 'The legislative way of life' " it has been noted, "is the essence of
freedom under government." Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the Construction
of Statutes, 43 CAI,.L. REV. 652, 653 (1955).
302. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 164, at 9 11.33;Ely, Constitutional Interpretiuism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L. J. 399, 402 (1978).
303. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555-56.
304. See generally Burden of Proof, supra note 30, at 1057 11.152.
August 1979, at 33; Brest,
305. See Sowell, Myths about Minorities, COMMENTARY,
supra note 13, at 2.
306. See, eg., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 348-49 (1978)
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persuasive that it need be feared that confining its scope to the
constitutional framework will appreciably diminish the sphere of
its influence. Resecuring the judiciary to its constitutional moorings in the area of statutory interpretation will not inhibit equality's advocates from implementing this value through the democratic process. On the other hand, failure to observe the
strictures of the Constitution in this area may imperil the ability
of others to implement equality's rival value-liberty.
Stephen L. Fluckiger

(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the 10% "set-aside"
by legislatures for public work project funds for minority businesses).

